No field of historical study seems so to dispose its adherents to find anachronistic forerunners and adumbrations as does the history of science. It is astonishing how often we find in the works of historians of science and natural philosophy, whatever their motives, expressions such as the "ancient Copernicus," the "precursor of Leonardo," the "medieval Hume," or the like. Such extravagances continually compel other historians of science to take time out to refute or modify these often rhetorical claims, or at least to put them in perspective.
No medieval schoolman has been singled out as a precursor more often than the French scholastic Nicole Oresme. This brilliant scholar has been credited with the framing of Gresham's Law before Gresham, with the invention of analytic geometry before Descartes, with propounding structural theories of compounds before the nineteenth-century organic chemists, with discovering the law of free fall before Galileo, and with advocating the rotation of the earth before Copernicus. None of these claims is, in fact, true, although each is based on discussions by Oresme of some penetration and originality.
1 Note that Clagett affirmed Oresme's brilliance and originality. He proceeded to describe Oresme's distinctive ideas in natural philosophy. We learn from Clagett that Oresme provides an almost unique example of a medieval scientist whose progressive develop-ment can be examined in some detail, and Clagett traces how some of his ideas may have reached a few seventeenth-century authors like Galileo. That said, we must also reflect on the fact that after more than one hundred and fifty pages of introduction and about five hundred pages of edition, translation, and commentary, we are also left with the following dismal conclusions. "Oresme's association of the configuration doctrine with particular phenomena was entirely imaginative and hypothetical" (48). "The configuration doctrine … had little use, either in Oresme's time or later, in deepening and extending the knowledge of qualitative and psychological phenomena" (48-49). "It is not surprising, then, that the configuration doctrine as a technique to account for phenomena died with Oresme and Henry of Hesse" (121). And if these comments taken out of context seem unpersuasive, then consider his concluding judgment: "One final remark is necessary. Although Oresme had no interest in experimental measurement and in fact his system was not designed for such measurement, still he did try, for the most part, to present a naturalistic mechanism for the explanation of phenomena and certainly the wave of the future rolled in that direction" (121).
It seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that only because Oresme's inclination to seek naturalistic explanations turned out to be the path later pursued and developed that he commands any interest. The reader who works through Clagett's book will look in vain for any explanation (except narrowly textual ones) as to how it was possible for someone like Oresme to appear in the fourteenth century. Such an explanation will be speculative and hypothetical, to be sure, but it is only through running the risk of being wrong that we may begin to construct the path that may lead to the most plausible explanations of Oresme's ideas and their place in the fourteenth century.
The above introduction makes principally two points. Beware of "precursoritis" but be bold in proposing answers to questions about the significance of authors' ideas for their era.
In the very large, dense, and ambitious book under review, we come to grips with a culturally holistic effort to understand the origins of modern scientific culture. Quantitative strategies in the modern approach to the world appeared first, not in the seventeenth century, but in the fourteenth, principally in the works of Nicole Oresme. Because Oresme exercised direct influence on few contemporaries or immediate successors, Ulrich Taschow urges us
